A perfectly secure symmetric encryption scheme: ONE-TIME PAD

This encryption scheme achieves information-theoric security.

Definition 1 (Symmetric encryption)**.** Let $\mathscr{K}$ be a key space, $\mathscr{P}$ be a plain-text space and let $\mathscr{C}$ be a ciphertext space These three spaces are finite spaces.

A *symmetric encryption* scheme over $(\mathscr{K}, \mathscr{P}, \mathscr{C})$ is a tuple of three algorithms $(\mathrm{KeyGen}, \mathrm{Enc}, \mathrm{Dec})$:

- KeyGen provides a sample k of $\mathscr{K}$;
- $\mathrm{Enc} : \mathscr{K} \times \mathscr{P} \to \mathscr{C}$;
- $\mathrm{Dec} : \mathscr{K} \times \mathscr{C} \to \mathscr{P}$.

Without loss of generality, we will assume that $\operatorname{im} \mathrm{Enc} = \mathscr{C}$. We want to ensure **Correctness**: for any key $k \in \mathscr{K}$ and message $m \in \mathscr{P}$, we have that:

$$\mathrm{Dec}(k, \mathrm{Enc}(k, m)) = m.$$

The elements m and k are independent random variables and all the elements in $\mathscr{K}$ and $\mathscr{P}$ have non-zero probability.

Remark 1. The algorithm Enc could (and should[1]) be probabilistic. However, the algorithm Dec is deterministic.

So far, we did not talk about efficiency of these algorithms.

Definition 2 (Shannon, 1949). A symmetric encryption scheme is said to have *perfect security* whenever, for any $\bar{m}$ and any $\bar{c}$,

$$\Pr_{k,m}[m = \bar{m} \mid \mathrm{Enc}_k(m) = \bar{c}] = \Pr_m[m = \bar{m}].$$

The intuition is that knowing the encrypted message tells me *nothing* about the message.

Lemma 1 (Shannon). Given a symmetric encryption scheme $(\mathrm{KeyGen}, \mathrm{Enc}, \mathrm{Dec})$ has perfect security then $|\mathscr{K}| \geq |\mathscr{P}|$.

Proof. Let $\bar{c} \in \mathscr{C}$ and define

$$\mathcal{S} := \{\bar{m} \in \mathscr{P} \mid \exists \bar{k} \in \mathscr{K}, \bar{m} = \mathrm{Dec}(\bar{k}, \bar{c})\}.$$

Let $N := |\mathcal{S}|$. We have that $N \leq |\mathscr{K}|$ as Dec is deterministic. We also have that $N \leq |\mathscr{P}|$ as $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathscr{P}$. Finally, assume $N < |\mathscr{P}|$. This means, there exists $\bar{m} \in \mathscr{P}$ such that $\bar{m} \notin \mathcal{S}$. Then,

$$\Pr[m = \bar{m} \mid \mathrm{Enc}_k(m) = \bar{c}] = 0,$$

but by assumption, $\Pr[m = \bar{m}] \neq 0$. So this is not a perfectly secure scheme. We can conclude that

$$N = |\mathscr{P}| \leq |\mathscr{K}|.$$

□

[1] If the algorithm is deterministic, if we see two identical ciphers we know that the messages are identical, and this can be seen as a vulnerability of this protocol.

Example 1 (One-Time PAD). Let $\mathcal{K} = \mathcal{C} = \mathcal{P} = \{0,1\}^\ell$. Here are the algorithms used:

- ▷ KeyGen samples from $\mathcal{U}(\{0,1\}^\ell)$.
- ▷ $\mathrm{Enc}(k,m)$ we compute the XOR $c = m \oplus k$.
- ▷ $\mathrm{Dec}(k,m)$ we compute the XOR $m = c \oplus k$.

Theorem 1. The One-Time PAD is a perfectly-secure symmetric encryption.

Proof. **Correctness.** We have that

$$\mathrm{Dec}(k, \mathrm{Enc}(k,m)) = k \oplus k \oplus m = m.$$

Security. We have, by independence of m and k we have that

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr[m = \bar{m} \mid \mathrm{Enc}(k,m) = \bar{c}] &= \Pr[m = \bar{m} \mid k \oplus m = \bar{c}] \\ &= \Pr[m = \bar{m}].\end{aligned}$$

□

Remark 2. This example is not practical:

- ▷ keys need to be larger than the message;
- ▷ you cannot encrypt twice: for example, $c_1 = m_1 \oplus k$ and $c_2 = m_2 \oplus k$, then we have $c_1 \oplus c_2 = m_1 \oplus m_2$.

This last part is why that protocol is called a *One-Time secure encryption*.